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by lAUren e. mArsh
The Revival of the “Sweeping Clause”:  An Analysis of  
Why the Supreme Court Had to “Breathe New Life” into the 
Necessary and Proper Clause in United States v. Comstock
introdUction
T
he protection of our nation’s children against 
the dangers of sex offenders has become a grow-
ing concern of our society. Child victims, such as 
Adam Walsh, whose death drew national attention 
and prompted the creation of “American’s Most Wanted,”1 
have increased society’s attention to 
sexual offenders. Statistics have dem-
onstrated that one in five girls and one 
in ten boys will be sexually exploited 
before they reach adulthood, and over 
two-thirds of all sexual assault victims 
are children.2 Additional research in-
dicates that sex offenses are less likely 
to be reported than any other offense, 
making it nearly impossible to accu-
rately measure the frequency of these 
incidents in any given year.3
Perhaps even more alarming is 
the recidivism rate of sex offenders. A 
Department of Justice report examin-
ing recidivism rates in fifteen states 
indicates that 5.3% of male offenders 
were rearrested for another sex-related 
crime within three years of their prison 
release.4 These numbers may fail to 
expose the true extent of the problem: 
a 2001 report revealed that re-offenses 
take place more than twice as often as are officially recorded.5
In response to this discomforting recidivism rate, numerous 
states have enacted legislation allowing for the civil commit-
ment of “sexually violent predators,” in hopes of curbing re-
offending rates for such offenders.6 In 2006, Congress decided 
to follow suit.
Congress passed the Adam Walsh Child Protection and 
Safety Act (“Adam Walsh Act” or “the Act”) in July of 2006.7 
The Act aimed to create more explicit and uniform registration 
requirements for sex offenders and to amend federal law and 
procedure regarding the civil commitment of sex offenders.8 
Title III, Section 301 of the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4248, authorizes 
the Attorney General or the Director of the Bureau of Prisons 
to certify a sex offender as “sexually dangerous” and order that 
person to be civilly committed to the custody of the Attorney 
General.9
This portion of the Adam Walsh Act has been challenged 
on the premise that it is an unconstitutional exercise of Con-
gressional authority.10 A number of district courts,11 as well the 
First, Fourth and Eighth Circuits,12 
were in disagreement as to the Act’s 
constitutionality. In June 2009, the 
Supreme Court of the United States 
granted certiorari to United States v. 
Comstock.13 On May 17, 2010, by a 
7-2 vote, the Supreme Court reversed 
the Fourth Circuit and held that Con-
gress had the constitutional authority 
to enact § 4248 under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.14
The Court’s decision drew a lot of 
attention; if not for the holding itself, 
then at least for the analysis the Court 
implemented in reaching its conclu-
sion.15 In every other recent decision 
addressing the federal government’s 
authority to enact legislation, the Su-
preme Court has applied an analysis 
under the Commerce Clause,16 rather 
than the Necessary and Proper Clause 
alone, to determine whether the law at 
issue was a constitutional exercise of 
congressional authority.17 Each of these cases applied a three-
prong test created in a 1995 decision, United States v. Lopez,18 
establishing that Congress only has the authority under the 
Commerce Clause to enact legislation if the act (1) regulates 
channels of interstate commerce, (2) regulates instrumentalities 
or persons or things within interstate commerce, or (3) substan-
tially effects interstate commerce.19
The basis for relying on the Commerce Clause in these 
cases was that the Necessary and Proper Clause, absent a suffi-
cient link to a power expressly granted to Congress in Article I, 
did not grant Congress the authority on its own to enact legisla-
tion.20 However, the Rehnquist Court’s Commerce Clause juris-
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prudence itself created a very narrow standard, greatly limiting 
the federal government’s ability to enact legislation through its 
commerce power.21 Rather than applying the rigid three-prong 
commerce power analysis in Comstock, the Supreme Court cre-
ated a new five-factor standard,22 concluding that the Necessary 
and Proper Clause granted Congress the authority to enact § 
4248.23
Regardless of whether this decision, as some have criticized, 
is a demonstration of the Court adopting policy over law,24 one 
thing is certain: if the Supreme Court wanted to uphold § 4248, 
it had no choice but to adopt a new analysis under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause in order to do so. This Comment will argue 
that, had the Supreme Court treated Comstock as a commerce 
power case, the precedent established by the Rehnquist Court 
would have prevented it from upholding § 4248. Specifically, it 
will demonstrate that § 4248 would not have survived the strin-
gent three-prong Lopez standard, and even in light the Supreme 
Court’s arguable expansion of commerce clause in its most re-
cent Commerce Clause decision, Gonzales v. Raich,25 the Court 
would not have been able to validate the enactment of § 4248 
on Commerce Clause grounds.
Part I of this Comment will provide a background of the 
constitutional provisions relevant to the issues presented in 
Comstock. Part II will provide a background of the Adam Walsh 
Act, § 4248 specifically, challenges to the provision, and a brief 
discussion of the Supreme Court’s decision in Comstock. Part 
III will demonstrate that in light of the recent Supreme Court de-
cisions that have limited the scope of Congress’ power, the gov-
ernment could not rely on the Commerce Clause to justify the 
validity of § 4248, and the Supreme Court had to adopt a new 
approach in order to validate the law. Part IV will describe the 
five-step approach that the Court decided to take and discuss the 
concerns that the concurring and dissenting Justices had with 
this framework. Part V will conclude with a brief discussion of 
the implications of the Court’s decision.
i. soUrces of, And limitAtions on, congress’  
AUthority to enAct legislAtion
Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution pres-
ents and defines the depth and breadth of Congressional author-
ity.26 Congress’ powers include the power to lay and collect 
taxes, the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and 
among the states, the power to coin money, the power to declare 
war, and the power to organize and provide for a military.27 
Congress also has the authority to enact any law that is “neces-
sary and proper” to execute either its enumerated powers or 
any powers the Constitution vests in the United States Govern-
ment.28 The Tenth Amendment limits the scope of Congressio-
nal authority and maintains that the powers not granted to the 
United States government are reserved “to the states” or “to the 
people.”29
This section will first discuss the Supreme Court’s inter-
pretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause and the constitu-
tional authority that this clause provides Congress. It will then 
describe the Supreme Court’s evolving interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause,30 and how the Court has expanded, and later 
limited, Congress’s power to enact legislation. Finally, it will 
address the implications of the Tenth Amendment as applied to 
state police powers.
A. the necessAry And ProPer clAUse
In McCulloch v. Maryland,31 the Supreme Court estab-
lished the meaning of the terms “necessary” and “proper” as 
interpreted in the Necessary and Proper Clause.32 The Court 
held that in this context “necessary” does not imply “an abso-
lute, physical necessity” but simply requires “that one thing is 
convenient, or useful, or essential to another.”33 Furthermore, 
the Court held that “proper” entails “all means which are ap-
propriate, which are plainly adapted” to an end that is already 
within the realm of Congress’ Constitutional authority.34 The 
Court maintained that the term “proper” modifies “necessary,” 
and that if the Framers intended strict necessity, it would have 
excluded the term “proper” altogether.35 Thus, for a law to be 
“necessary and proper” to the execution of powers enumerated 
to Congress, it does not have to be “necessary” in an essential or 
crucial sense, but rather, must be suitably tailored to the further-
ance of a power that is within Congress’ realm of authority.36
In general, Congress must use the Necessary and Proper 
Clause in conjunction with another constitutionally-enumerated 
power in order to have the authority to enact legislation.37 In 
other words, Congress cannot enact legislation simply under 
the premise that it is “necessary and proper” on its own; instead, 
the legislation must be necessary and proper to the furtherance 
of a power that Congress already possesses.38 For example, in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court upheld Congress’ establish-
ment of a National Bank, deeming it “necessary and proper” 
to the execution of Congress’ powers to lay and collect taxes, 
coin and borrow money, regulate commerce, conduct war, and 
to raise and support an army and a navy.39 The Necessary and 
Proper clause serves as an “adjunct” to Congressional authority 
rather than an independent source of power.40
b. the commerce clAUse
Congress often invokes its authority under the Commerce 
Clause in order to enact legislation.41 The Commerce Clause 
grants Congress the authority to regulate commerce “with for-
eign nations, and among the states, and with the Indian Tribes.”42 
In the Supreme Court’s landmark Commerce Clause case, Gib-
bons v. Ogden,43 Chief Justice John Marshall established that 
“commerce amongst the states” entails commerce that intermin-
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gles between states, but does not extend to commerce that stays 
strictly with the internal boundaries of one state.44
Between Gibbons and the New Deal,45 the Court continued 
to refine its definition of Congress’ commerce power through 
a number of cases. In United States v. E.C. Knight, Co.,46 the 
Court overturned a provision of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act that 
made illegal “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust 
or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce 
among the several states.”47 The Court reasoned that the enact-
ment was not within Congress’ constitutional authority because 
it only affected commerce “indirectly” and “incidentally.”48
However, after E.C. Knight, the Court began to expand 
its definition of interstate commerce. In the Shreveport Rate 
Case,49 the Court held that Congressio-
nal authority over the regulation of in-
terstate commerce extends to interstate 
“carriers” that serve as “instruments of 
interstate commerce.”50 In Swift & Co. 
v. United States,51 the Court held that 
when the target of Congress’ regula-
tion will enter the stream of interstate 
commerce, Congress has the authority 
to regulate activity related to that tar-
get, even if such regulation only occurs 
within one state.52
This expansion of Commerce 
Power came to a sudden halt during the 
New Deal, when the Court overturned a 
number of legislative acts, maintaining that a bright-line distinc-
tion existed between manufacturing and commerce.53 However, 
almost as quickly as the Court began overturning New Deal 
legislation, it turned a new course and abandoned the distinc-
tion between manufacturing and commerce in NLRB v. Jones 
& Laughlin Steel Co.54 In this case, the Court upheld the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, reasoning that the intrastate activity 
that it regulated had a “close and substantial relation” to inter-
state commerce.55 Furthermore, in United States v. Darby,56 the 
Court established that Congress has the power to regulate any 
intrastate activities that are “so commingled with or related to” 
interstate commerce that the regulation of interstate commerce 
requires the regulation of these activities.57 In Wickard v. Fil-
burn,58 the Court held that Congress’ authority to regulate may 
even reach entirely local activity if the aggregate effect of such 
activity has a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce.59
For about fifty years Congress had seemingly free reign 
to enact legislation invoking its authority under the Commerce 
Clause.60 However, the expansion of Commerce authority came 
to an end in 1995 when the Rehnquist Court decided United 
States v. Lopez,61 a case challenging Congress’ constitutional au-
thority to enact the Gun-Free School Zone Act (GFSZA) under 
the Commerce Clause.62 The Court held that the act “exceed[ed] 
the authority of Congress,” as it “neither regulate[d] a commer-
cial activity nor contain[ed] a requirement that the possession be 
connected in any way to interstate commerce.”63
Chief Justice Rehnquist identified three types of activities 
Congress may regulate under the commerce clause.64 Under the 
Lopez test, Congress may regulate (1) “channels” of interstate 
commerce,65 (2) “instrumentalities,” or persons or things in in-
terstate commerce,66 and (3) activities that “substantially affect” 
interstate commerce.67
The Court quickly determined that the Gun Free School 
Zones Act was neither a channel nor an instrumentality of inter-
state commerce.68 It, however, went into more detail when ad-
dressing the third prong, recognizing that the law “has not been 
clear” on the type of activities that may 
“substantially affect” interstate com-
merce.69 The Court held that either the 
target of the regulation must be a com-
mercial activity or the activity must be 
an “essential part of a larger regulation 
of economic activity.”70 In analyzing 
the Gun Free School Zones Act under 
this third prong, the Court ultimately 
found three shortcomings: that it was a 
“criminal statute that by its terms ha[d] 
nothing to do with ‘commerce,’” that it 
“contain[ed] no jurisdictional element” 
that could “ensure” that it affected inter-
state commerce, and that it did not con-
tain any “express congressional findings” as to the effect the 
law had on interstate commerce.71 The Court ultimately over-
turned the Act under the “substantial effects” prong, asserting 
that ruling otherwise would require the Court to “pile inference 
upon inference” in such a way that would ultimately give Con-
gress having a “general police power of the sort retained by the 
States”—something that it was “unwilling to do.”72
The Rehnquist Court applied Lopez again five years later. 
In United States v. Morrison,73 the Court struck down a provi-
sion of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) that pro-
vided that offenders of gender-motivated sexual violence could 
be held civilly liable for damages against the person they in-
jured.74 In Morrison, the Court emphasized that its decision in 
Lopez relied on the fact that the targeted activity was of “non-
economic, criminal nature” and that the link between possessing 
a gun and its “substantial effect on interstate commerce was 
attenuated.”75 Contrary to the case in Lopez, the government in 
Morrison put forth findings in support of their argument that 
gender-motivated violence has an impact on interstate com-
merce.76 Nonetheless, the Court still overturned this provision 
of the Act, reasoning that such findings were “weakened by the 
fact that they rel[ied] so heavily on a method of reasoning” that 
the Court had already deemed “unworkable.”77
For about fifty years 
Congress had seemingly 
free reign to enact 
legislation invoking 
its authority under the 
Commerce Clause.
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As with the statute at issue in Lopez, the Court in Mor-
rison expressed concern that accepting the government’s argu-
ment would “obliterate the Constitution’s distinction between 
national and local authority.”78 The Court found the same short-
comings in this provision of the Violence Against Women Act, 
and accordingly, found the provision to be an unconstitutional 
exercise of Congress’ authority.79 In doing so, the Court dem-
onstrated its commitment to maintaining a distinction between 
violence that impacts interstate commerce, and violence that is 
entirely intra-state and meant to be within “the province of the 
states.”80
Though the Rehnquist Court indicated that Congress did 
not have unlimited authority to enact legislation,81 it took a new 
direction soon after in Gonzales v. Raich,82 upholding a regula-
tion that, as it was applied, did not have a direct connection to 
interstate commerce.83 In a 6-3 decision, the Court upheld the 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA), which “[made] it unlawful 
to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess any controlled 
substance,” except as allowed by the Act itself.84 The respon-
dents did not challenge the constitutionality of the Act on its 
face but rather asserted that the law’s “prohibition of the manu-
facture and possession of marijuana,” as applied to their use 
of it for medicinal purposes, exceeded Congress’ Commerce 
Clause authority.85
In upholding the CSA, the Court likened this case to Wick-
ard, reasoning that “failure to regulate” the controlled substance 
market, even for home consumption, would “affect price and 
market conditions.”86 Ultimately, because the CSA regulated 
activities that were “quintessentially economic,” and affected 
the “production, distribution, and consumption of commodi-
ties,” the Court concluded that Congress had acted within its 
authority in enacting the CSA.87
Justice Scalia authored a concurring opinion in Raich, as-
serting that he had a more “nuanced” understanding of the “doc-
trinal foundation” on which the Court’s holding should rest.88 
Unlike the majority, Justice Scalia relied on the Necessary and 
Proper Clause as the constitutional source of Congress’ author-
ity to regulate the home consumption of marijuana.89 In doing 
so, he recognized that the objective of the CSA was to “extin-
guish the interstate market in Schedule I controlled substances, 
including marijuana,” and insisted Congress’ authority to enact 
a prohibition of intrastate consumption of marijuana depended 
on whether it was an “appropriate means of achieving the legiti-
mate end of [eliminating] Schedule I substances from interstate 
commerce.”90 In finding that the CSA was, in fact, an appropri-
ate means of obtaining Congress’ objective, Scalia agreed with 
the Court majority that the regulation should be sustained.91
Raich was the last major Commerce Clause case that the 
Court has decided. By upholding legislation that, at least in that 
instance, regulated wholly intrastate activity, Raich has argu-
ably departed from Chief Justice Rehnquist’s original limita-
tions on commerce power. As a result, the Court made it unclear 
whether Raich marked a departure from the Lopez framework 
altogether or rather provides an example of an intrastate activ-
ity that survives Lopez’s “substantially affects” test.92 Moving 
forward, it was unclear whether Raich will be recognized as the 
direction the Court would take in the future or whether the Court 
will continue to apply Lopez’s three-part framework when is-
sues of congressional authority arose.93
c. the tenth Amendment And the “PoWers  
 reserved to the stAtes”
The Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
states that “the powers not delegated to the United States by the 
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the 
States respectively, or to the people.”94 The Supreme Court has 
read this amendment to imply that any power not conferred to the 
federal legislative branch was intended to be left to the states.95 
Included in these powers is the state police power—the power to 
regulate the internal matters of a state, including, for example, the 
power to enact “[i]nspection laws, quarantine laws, [and] health 
laws,” as well as the “power of a State to regulate its police, its 
domestic trade, and to govern its own citizens.”96 The Supreme 
Court has read into the Tenth Amendment that, coinciding with 
Article I’s exclusion of a general federal police power, the fram-
ers intended to reserve police powers for the states to regulate.97 
The Court thus recognizes that the Constitution intended to “with-
hold[] from Congress a plenary police power” and that legislation 
that cuts into this power without the support of one of Congress’ 
enumerated powers is unconstitutional.98
ii. the AdAm WAlsh Act And the circUit  
sPlit creAted over § 4248
A. descriPtion of the Act And its civil  
 commitment Provision
Congress enacted the Adam Walsh Child Protection and 
Safety Act99 (Adam Walsh Act) in 2006.100 The Adam Walsh 
Act aimed to create more stringent and uniform requirements 
for sex offenders, new definitions and classifications of sex of-
fenders, and a civil commitment program for those offenders 
that are deemed to pose a threat of committing sexually violent 
crimes in the future.101 Title III of the Act, 18 U.S.C. § 4248, 
authorizes the Attorney General, or any person authorized by 
the Attorney General or the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), to certify 
a person who (1) is in custody of the Bureau of Prisons, (2) is 
in the custody of the Attorney General as a result of his or her 
incompetence to stand trial, or (3) has had all criminal charges 
dropped for mental health reasons, as a “sexually dangerous 
person.”102
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As defined by the Adam Walsh Act, a “sexually dangerous 
person” is a person who “has engaged or attempted to engage in 
sexually violent conduct or child molestation and who is sexu-
ally dangerous to others” or a person who “suffers from serious 
mental illness, abnormality, or disorder as a result of which he 
would have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually violent 
conduct or child molestation.”103 Upon certifying a person as 
“sexually dangerous,” the Attorney General or Director of the 
BOP must transmit the certification to the clerk of the court of 
the district in which that person is confined.104
Under the Act, if the district court determines based on 
clear and convincing evidence that the person is “sexually dan-
gerous,” it shall then commit that person to the custody of the 
Attorney General.105 The Attorney General then must attempt to 
release that person to an official of the State of that individual’s 
domicile, if the state chooses to assume responsibility for the 
individual’s “custody, care, and treatment.”106 However, if the 
state does not assume responsibility for the individual, the At-
torney General shall then place the person in a treatment facility 
until (1) the state chooses to assume responsibility, or (2) the 
person’s condition improves so that he is no longer sexually 
dangerous if released and prescribed medical, psychiatric, or 
psychological treatment.107
Although numerous states have implemented legislation 
providing for the civil commitment of sexually violent preda-
tors,108 § 4248 is the first federal provision calling for a federal 
program to civilly commit sexually dangerous persons.109 Unlike 
many of these state provisions, § 4248 allows for the civil com-
mitment of any federal sex offender, regardless of the severity 
of the crime or his likelihood to re-commit.110 The government 
can have an offender civilly committed after he has completed 
his prison sentence, and may wait until the person’s sentence 
has expired to determine the risk he poses.111 This makes § 4248 
different from other federal civil commitment programs, which 
generally call for civil commitment prior to court proceedings 
or sentence completion.112
b. chAllenges to § 4248
Petitioners across the country have challenged this civil 
commitment provision of the Adam Walsh Act in federal court, 
and circuits had split on the question of whether Congress had 
the constitutional authority to enact this portion of the legisla-
tion. In United States v. Comstock,113 the Fourth Circuit invali-
dated § 4248 and held that neither the Commerce Clause nor 
the Necessary and Proper clause conferred upon Congress the 
authority to enact this civil commitment provision.114 The court 
found that § 4248 did not target channels of interstate commerce 
or persons or things in interstate commerce.115 Moreover, it held 
that target of the § 4248, “sexual dangerousness,” does not sub-
stantially affect interstate commerce.116
The court also rejected the government’s argument that 
§ 4248 is necessary and proper to the government’s ability to 
“establish and maintain” the federal criminal justice and penal 
systems and to its authority to prevent “sex-related crimes,” and 
that § 4248 fit squarely with the government’s power to pros-
ecute under the Necessary and Proper Clause.117 Emphasizing 
that the Necessary and Proper Clause merely allows Congress to 
enact laws that are necessary to the execution powers vested by 
the Constitution, the Fourth Circuit held that the constitutional 
provision, on its own, “creates no constitutional power.”118 Fur-
thermore, the court emphasized that control over the mentally 
ill is a police power that is generally reserved to the states.119
Although the Fourth Circuit invalidated § 4248, the Eighth 
Circuit upheld this provision of the Adam Walsh Act several 
months later in United States v. Tom.120 As in Comstock, the 
Eighth Circuit in Tom acknowledged that Congress did not 
identify the source of its authority to enact § 4248.121 None-
theless, the Eighth Circuit found that Congress had the “ancil-
lary authority” under the Necessary and Proper Clause to enact 
§ 4248; this provision aimed to prevent the commission of 
sex offenses for which Congress did possess the authority to 
enact.122 In other words, the court reasoned that because the pris-
oners affected by § 4248 were incarcerated pursuant to federal 
sex offense statutes for which Congress had the constitutional 
authority to enact, § 4248 was a “rational and appropriate,” and 
thus necessary and proper, means of effectuating federal sex 
crime legislation.123
While the Fourth Circuit relied heavily on the Supreme 
Court’s commerce power analyses in Lopez and Morrison to 
invalidate § 4248, the Eight Circuit in Tom applied Justice 
Scalia’s concurring opinion in Raich.124 In applying this ratio-
nale, the Eighth Circuit concluded that Congress can regulate 
intrastate activities that do not substantially affect interstate 
commerce when such regulation is necessary to make its regu-
lation of interstate commerce, as a whole, effective.125 The court 
maintained that prior commission of a sexually violent crime 
was indicative of one’s “propensity” to engage in other feder-
ally prohibited sexual conduct in the future.126 Because § 4248 
aimed to prevent the further commission of federal crime, the 
court therefore viewed this potential crime prevention as a nec-
essary means to make federal sex offense laws effective.127
Several months after Tom, the First Circuit also concluded 
that § 4248 was not an unconstitutional exercise of Congressio-
nal authority.128 In United States v. Volungus, the First Circuit 
relied heavily on an earlier Supreme Court decision, Greenwood 
v. United States,129 to conclude that § 4248 was “within the 
scope of Congress’s constitutional authority under the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause.”130 In Greenwood, the Supreme Court 
held that Congress had the authority to enact a similar provision 
that granted the federal government the authority to civilly com-
mit individuals that were found to be incompetent to stand trial 
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due to their mental illness.131 Because the Supreme Court found 
that Congress had the “auxiliary” authority to enact that provi-
sion in Greenwood, the First Circuit determined that Congress 
similarly had such authority to enact § 4248 in Volungus.132
Although only three circuits have addressed the constitu-
tionality of § 4248, this issue has created a divide among dis-
trict courts throughout the nation.133 Districts addressing § 4248 
have upheld the provision, finding Congressional authority 
in the Necessary and Proper and Commerce Clauses to enact 
this provision.134 However, several district courts have adopted 
arguments similar to those of the Fourth Circuit in Comstock, 
finding § 4248 invalid.135 The decisions in Comstock and Tom 
created a circuit split over the constitutionality of § 4248. The 
Supreme Court resolved this split in the current term, holding 
that the Necessary and Proper Clause granted Congress the au-
thority to enact § 4248.136
iii. the sUPreme coUrt hAd to creAte A neW 
stAndArd in ComstoCk to UPhold § 4248 
becAUse the Act WoUld not hAve sUrvived An 
AnAlysis Under the Lopez test, And becAUse the
coUrt hAd only estAblished limited Precedent 
Using the necessAry And ProPer clAUse As
A stAnd-Alone to enAct legislAtion.
In light of the Supreme Court’s reliance on the implementa-
tion of a commerce power analysis 
in other recent federalism cases, it 
would not have been unreason-
able to assume that, in order to re-
main consistent with the Rehnquist 
Court’s approach, the Roberts Court 
would have applied the three-part 
framework created in Lopez, and 
applied in Morrison and Raich, to 
reach a decision in Comstock. How-
ever, had the Court done so, § 4248 
would have been doomed; the Court 
simply could not have found § 4248 
to be Constitutional under a Com-
merce Clause analysis without departing from the stringent Lopez 
framework. Moreover, simply turning to precedent addressing 
the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause, on its own, would 
not have yielded the Court a sufficient basis uphold the validity of 
§ 4248.
This section will argue that the Court had no choice but to 
create a new standard in order to justify its decision that § 4248 
was a constitutional exercise of Congressional authority. First, 
it will demonstrate that the Commerce Clause did not provide 
Congress with sufficient authority to enact this provision under 
the Lopez test, and, even if the Court had analyzed the provision 
under the arguably less stringent standard created in Raich, it 
would not have been able to find that § 4248 “substantially af-
fects” interstate commerce. Next, this section will explain why 
Necessary and Proper jurisprudence that was established prior 
to Comstock did not provide a sufficient basis for the Court to 
justify upholding § 4248, and that, consequently, the Court had 
to refine its Necessary and Proper Clause analysis by creating 
its new five-part standard.
A. in APPlying the three-Prong test  
 imPlemented in Lopez And morrison, 
 congress did not hAve the AUthority Under  
 the commerce clAUse to enAct § 4248.
While the government relied heavily on the Commerce 
Clause in the earlier stages of litigation to justify the enactment 
of § 4248,137 it is an argument that it discarded once Comstock 
reached the high Court.138 The government abandoned this 
argument with good reason: had it relied solely on the Com-
merce Clause, it would have presented the Court with a losing 
argument.
This subsection will argue that, regardless of which Com-
merce Clause standard the Court would have applied, the 
government’s Commerce Clause argument would not have pre-
vailed in United States v. Comstock. First, it will demonstrate 
that although Raich was the Court’s most recent Commerce 
Clause decision, it would have been more appropriate for the 
Court to apply the three-prong test 
established in Lopez to determine 
whether Congress had the authority 
to enact § 4248. It will then dem-
onstrate that § 4248 would not have 
survived any of the three prongs of 
the Lopez test. Finally, it will show 
that, even if the Court had chosen 
to apply Raich, rather than Lopez, 
as the commerce power standard, 
the law still would not have passed 
constitutional muster, as it does not 
regulate activities that are “quintes-
sentially economic” in nature.139
i. Lopez and Morrison, rather than Raich, 
 would have been controlling in United States 
 v. Comstock.
As discussed above, Congress enjoyed half a century of es-
sentially unlimited power under the Court’s Commerce Clause 
interpretation until the Rehnquist Court halted its expansion in 
the mid-nineties in Lopez, and reaffirmed its commitment to 
strengthening federalism in Morrison.140 Raich, however, raised 
speculation as to how far the Supreme Court was willing to 
had it [the government] 
relied solely on the 
Commerce Clause, it would 
have presented the Court 
with a losing argument.
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go in maintaining a divide between what the federal govern-
ment has the authority to regulate and what should be left to 
the states.141 As Raich was the Supreme Court’s most recent 
Commerce Clause case, one might expect that the Court would 
have turned to this decision for guidance if it had applied a 
Commerce Clause analysis to § 4248. When the ruling in Raich 
emerged, many scholars believed that this decision marked the 
end of the Rehnquist’s federalism expansion.142 However, many 
scholars have suggested, and this comment asserts, that Raich 
merely demonstrates one circumstance in which the Court 
found it plausible to reconcile the regulation of wholly intrastate 
activity with the limitations that the Commerce Clause imposes 
on Congress’ authority to enact legislation.143 Accordingly, 
this subsection will demonstrate why the Lopez and Morrison 
framework would have been the more appropriate standard to 
apply to § 4248.
Raich is distinguishable from these other Rehnquist Court 
decisions in at least three respects. First, unlike Lopez and Mor-
rison, Raich involved an “as-applied” challenge to an Act that, 
on its face, was a valid exercise of Congressional authority.144 
Unlike the petitioners in Lopez and Morrison, who contended 
that the Acts in question fell outside the scope of Congressional 
authority altogether,145 the respondents in Raich merely chal-
lenged the Controlled Substances Act as it applied to their per-
sonal, intrastate consumption of marijuana.146 The Court referred 
to this distinction between Raich and the previous cases as “piv-
otal” to its decision, asserting that where a regulated class of 
activities is “within the reach of federal power,” courts cannot 
“excise, as trivial, individual instances of the class.”147 Because 
Comstock was a facial challenge to a statute, as opposed to an 
as-applied to challenge to an otherwise valid statute,148 this case 
would have warranted an analysis under the Lopez standard.149
Second, the more stringent Lopez standard would have 
been the more appropriate test to apply, given the similarities 
between § 4248 and the laws at issue in Lopez150 and Morri-
son.151 Both the Gun-Free School Zone Act (GFSZA) and the 
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) took on the role of a 
police power—a power that is generally left to the states to reg-
ulate.152 Because both Acts aimed to control the behavior of in-
dividuals within a state,153 neither act demonstrated any specific 
attachment to the regulation of interstate commerce.154 The Su-
preme Court has recognized such infringement on state police 
powers as grounds for overturning congressional statutes when 
such statutes have no connection to interstate commerce.155
On the other hand, the Controlled Substances Act, which 
was at issue in Raich, was a “comprehensive regulatory statute” 
that regulated the “production, distribution, and possession” of 
a substance for which there was a substantial (although illegal) 
market.156 In its decision in Raich, the Supreme Court empha-
sized the idea that the activities that CSA regulated, unlike those 
regulated by the GFSZA and the VAWA, were “commercial” 
and “quintessentially economic.”157 Although the activities of 
the respondents’ in Raich remained entirely within the confines 
of the state of California, the Court concluded that Congress had 
a “rational basis” for concluding that the respondents’ consump-
tion of marijuana, “taken in the aggregate,” had the potential of 
“substantially affect[ing]” interstate commerce.158
Of the legislation challenged in the three most recent Com-
merce Clause decisions, § 4248 more closely resembles the 
legislation at issue in Lopez and Morrison than the regulation 
challenged in Raich. As in Lopez and Morrison, the Court in 
Comstock addressed the constitutionality of an act that is “non-
economic” and “criminal” in nature.159 The VAWA provision 
at issue in Morrison sought to regulate individual acts of sexual 
violence against women generally;160 the GFSZA at issue in 
Lopez aimed to regulate the conduct of individuals who might 
possess a gun while in a school zone.161 Similar to these laws, 
§ 4248 aims to regulate the individual acts of sexually violent 
predators by preventing their release into the public until they 
are no longer deemed to be a threat to the safety of others.162
Third, unlike the Controlled Substances Act, and much like 
the VAWA and the GFSZA, § 4248 does not target activity 
that is part of “comprehensive regulatory regime” which aims to 
control activities that are “quintessentially economic.”163 Raich 
applied an “aggregate effects” test due to the CSA’s relation 
to the “production, distribution, and consumption of commodi-
ties.”164 Just as the “non-economic nature” of the VAWA pro-
vision and the GFSZA played an essential role in the Court’s 
decision, so too would the non-economic nature of § 4248 have 
had a bearing in Comstock. Because § 4248 is lacking this eco-
nomic tie, which was the key element in the Raich, the standard 
developed in Raich would not have been appropriate to apply 
in Comstock.
ii. If the Court had applied the three-part  
 framework established in Lopez, the Court 
 would not have found that the Commerce Clause 
 granted Congress the authority to enact § 4248.
Assuming that the Court would have used Lopez as its 
guidepost, it would have applied the cases’ three-part test to 
determine whether Congress had the authority to enact § 4248. 
In doing so, the Court would have found that § 4248 does not 
survive any of the tests three prongs, as it does not, (1) regulate 
the “channels” of interstate commerce, (2) regulate “instrumen-
talities” or persons or things within interstate commerce, or (3) 
have a substantial affect on interstate commerce as established 
in the Court’s recent commerce clause jurisprudence.165
As was the case in Lopez, the Court in Comstock would 
have quickly recognized that § 4248 does not satisfy the first 
prong of the Lopez test.166 It is evident here that § 4248 does 
not regulate “channels” of interstate commerce, as the term 
“channels” refers to the means through which items in interstate 
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commerce might travel—such as a river or a roadway.167 Sec-
tion 4248, to the contrary, aims to regulate the placement and 
behavior of people, and the actions that the government and the 
Bureau of Prisons may take in order to ensure that these people 
do not pose a danger to others.168
Furthermore, the Supreme Court would have found that § 
4248 does not regulate “instrumentalities” of interstate com-
merce, nor necessarily persons or things within interstate 
commerce, just as it did in Lopez and Morrison.169 The term 
“instrumentalities,” as applied to interstate commerce, refers to 
the types of mechanisms that might be used in order to ship 
or move goods throughout interstate commerce.170 Again, § 
4248 aims to regulate people—rather than things—and it does 
not require that the people it regulates have any connection to 
interstate commerce.171 Thus, the only way that § 4248 would 
have survived under the Lopez test would have been if the Court 
found that it otherwise has a substantial effect on interstate com-
merce.172
Section 4248 would not have survived this third and final 
prong of the Lopez test. Like the Gun-Free School Zones Act 
and the Violence Against Women Act, the link between § 4248 
and interstate commerce is, at best, “attenuated.”173 As the Su-
preme Court in Morrison observed, in the cases in which the 
Court upheld federal legislation that regulated intrastate activ-
ity based on its “substantial effects on interstate commerce,” it 
did so because “the activity in question has been some sort of 
economic endeavor.”174 Like the provisions in Lopez and Mor-
rison, § 4248 is a criminal statute, aiming to regulate offenders 
of violent crimes, and having no relation to commerce or the 
economic market.175
The Court would have recognized many of the same short-
comings of § 4248 that recognized the GFSZA and the VAWA 
provision to be lacking. The Court rejected the government’s 
argument in Lopez in large part because it did not provide any 
findings regarding the effect that gun possession in a school 
zone would have on interstate commerce.176 As was the case in 
Lopez, Congress purported no findings as to the link between § 
4248 and interstate commerce in several of the cases that chal-
lenged the Act’s constitutionality.177 However, as demonstrated 
in Morrison, even the effects of such findings may not salvage a 
law that targets sexually violent crimes when, on its face, it has 
no direct tie to interstate commerce.178
Furthermore, the concern the Court had in Morrison was 
one that may very well have come into play in Comstock: that 
if it were to accept the government’s argument regarding the 
law’s relation to interstate commerce, such a decision would 
allow Congress to regulate essentially any crime under the guise 
of its commerce power.179 The aim of Lopez and Morrison, was 
to put an end to Congress’ free reign in enacting legislation by 
claiming such legislation regulated interstate commerce.180 If 
the Court were to find that § 4248’s civil commitment provision 
substantially affected interstate commerce, it would give Con-
gress a whole new opportunity to assert its commerce power in 
ways that the Court deemed inappropriate in Lopez and Mor-
rison.181 While the decision in Comstock certainly opened new 
doors through which Congress could regulate, the Court de-
cided this case in a way that left intact the limitations that the 
Rehnquist Court placed on Congress’ commerce power.182 
iii. Even if the Court did apply Raich in United 
 States v. Comstock, it would still have found 
 that § 4248 falls outside the scope of  
 congressional authority.
Assuming, arguendo, that the Court did find that Raich 
would have been controlling in Comstock, it would nonetheless 
have found that the Commerce Clause did not grant Congress 
the authority to enact § 4248. Essential to the Court’s holding in 
Raich was that the CSA regulated the “production, distribution, 
and consumption of commodities,” and thus, that the activities 
it regulated were “quintessentially economic” in nature.183 Thus, 
even if the Court were to apply this “aggregate effects” test, 
rather than Lopez’s “substantially effects” test, it would have 
been quick to find that § 4248 does not aim to regulate any as-
pect of the market or activities that are in any way economic in 
nature.184 Section 4248 is a regulation aimed at preventing non-
economic violence,185 and as such, could not possibly have the 
effect of altering the market in such a way that the Court found 
the CSA would in Raich.186
Even the Court’s adoption of Justice Scalia’s concurring 
opinion in Raich would have placed § 4248 outside the realm of 
congressional authority.187 In his opinion, Justice Scalia asserted 
that Congress’ power to regulate activities that substantially af-
fect interstate commerce “cannot come from the Commerce 
Clause alone.”188 Instead, Justice Scalia insisted that Congress’ 
authority over the regulation of intrastate activities extends to 
“even noneconomic local activity” in order to “take all mea-
sures necessary or appropriate to the effective regulation of the 
interstate market.”189 However, even Justice Scalia emphasized 
the close tie the respondents’ home-consumption of marijuana 
had to the interstate market, sharing the majority’s concern that 
their use of the drug could “undercut” the interstate market.190 
Section 4248 lacks such ties. Thus, even if the Court had ad-
opted Justice Scalia’s reasoning in Comstock, § 4248 would not 
have survived under a commerce power argument.191
In short, regardless of whether and how the Court applied 
Lopez or Raich as controlling law, it would have reached the 
conclusion that the Commerce Clause did not grant Congress 
the authority to enact § 4248. Apparently recognizing the short-
comings of applying a commerce power analysis to § 4248, the 
Court was clearly determined to find an alternate route to vali-
date this provision. The Necessary and Proper Clause provided 
Criminal Law Brief 31
the Court with this route, but the Court still had to create its own 
path to reach its conclusion.
b. nothing in sUPreme coUrt Precedent  
 Prior to ComstoCk WoUld sUggest thAt 
 the necessAry And ProPer clAUse, As A  
 stAndAlone, grAnted congress the  
 AUthority to enAct § 4248.
Although the Supreme Court ultimately relied on the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause to reach the conclusion that Congress 
had the authority to enact § 4248, it had to create a new standard, 
rather than rely on precedent, in 
order to do so. Nothing in Supreme 
Court precedent suggested that this 
provision could stand on its own 
without a direct link to an enumer-
ated power of Congress, given that 
the Necessary and Proper Clause 
only explicitly grants Congress the 
authority to enact legislation that 
is necessary and proper to a power 
enumerated in the Constitution.192 
In fact, the Fourth Circuit pointed 
out that the government failed to 
cite any precedent that directly sup-
ported its argument that § 4248 is a 
necessary and a proper exercise of 
its power to run a federal penal sys-
tem,193 and each of the district courts 
that upheld § 4248 heavily relied on 
the decisions of various circuits of the United States Courts of 
Appeals, rather than citing Supreme Court precedent.194 This is 
because the government could not directly point to a specific 
enumerated power that § 4248 served to execute.195
Although precedent on the issue of Necessary and Proper 
authority was sparse, the government did have one Supreme 
Court case strongly on its side. Greenwood v. United States 
was the only Supreme Court decision any of the federal courts 
have cited when upholding § 4248 on Necessary and Proper 
grounds.196 In Greenwood, the Supreme Court upheld 18 U.S.C. 
§4246, a provision that allowed for the civil commitment of fed-
eral defendants found incompetent to stand trial, and who posed 
a threat of danger to the community or to themselves if released 
back into the public.197 The Court found the statute necessary 
and proper because the defendant was under the legal custody of 
the United States and the federal government’s power to pros-
ecute had not been exhausted.198
However, Greenwood alone could not be relied on to up-
hold the constitutionality of § 4248. The scope of § 4248 is 
broader than was that of § 4246, and, moreover, the decision in 
Greenwood was intended to be a narrow one.199 In Greenwood, 
the Court recognized that the legislature narrowly tailored § 
4246 to only apply to individuals in the legal custody of the 
United States who had been charged with a federal crime but 
had not yet been tried for that crime.200 Comparatively, section 
4248 applies to any individual in custody of the Attorney Gen-
eral who has been found incompetent to stand trial, any individ-
ual in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons, and any individual 
who had their charges dismissed for reasons concerning their 
lack of mental competency.201 The statute in Greenwood only 
permitted the federal government to civilly commit offenders 
before the completion of their trial; Section § 4248 allows the 
government to civilly commit of-
fenders before or after criminal their 
proceedings.202 Because § 4248 can 
apply to anyone in legal custody of 
the United States, 203 the reach of § 
4248 goes beyond the government’s 
power to prosecute, and reaches into 
the point where this power has been 
exhausted.204
Moreover, § 4248 is more of 
a proactive provision than a reac-
tive one, in essence giving Con-
gress the authority to civilly commit 
those who may commit state of-
fenses, rather than simply federal of-
fenses.205 As opposed to the statute 
at issue in Greenwood, § 4248 aims 
to prevent the future commission of 
crime rather than to simply retain 
those who have already been accused of committing one.206 In 
doing so, the provision makes no distinction between aiming to 
prevent the commission of federal crimes, and those actions pro-
hibited by state law.207 This again demonstrates that the § 4248 
has a broader reach than did the law at issue in Greenwood.
For all these reasons, Greenwood did not provide sufficient 
support for the proposition that § 4248 was a constitutional 
exercise of Congressional authority. While it provided useful 
guidance,208 the Court had to take its analysis beyond this prec-
edent to reach the conclusion that § 4248 was valid.
iv. rAther thAn relying on the commerce 
clAUse to vAlidAte § 4248, the coUrt creAted 
A neW stAndArd Under the necessAry And ProPer 
clAUse to UPhold the vAlidity of the lAW, 
creAting A neW AvenUe for congress to JUstify 
its enActment of sWeePing legislAtion.
Giving the Commerce Clause only very short shrift, the 
Supreme Court turned to the Necessary and Proper Clause to 
§ 4248 is more of a 
proactive provision than 
a reactive one, in essence 
giving Congress the 
authority to civilly commit 
those who may commit state 
offenses, rather than simply 
federal offenses.
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justify the validity of § 4248 in United States v. Comstock. In his 
majority opinion, Justice Breyer took five factors into account 
to reach the conclusion that Congress had the authority to enact 
§ 4248 as “necessary and proper for carrying into execution the 
powers vested by the Constitution in the Government of the 
United States.”209 These factors included: (1) “the breadth of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause”; (2) the “long history of federal 
involvement” in the arena of civilly committing the mentally 
ill; (3) the “sound reasons” for the enactment of § 4248 in light 
of the federal government’s “custodial interest in safeguarding 
the public from dangers posed by those in federal custody”; (4) 
the fact that the statute took into account, and accommodated 
for, state interests; and (5) the narrow scope of § 4248.210 With-
out providing further explanation or guidance as to the weight 
each of these factors must hold, or whether all of these factors 
must be satisfied in order for an act of Congress to suffice as 
necessary and proper, the majority simply established that in 
considering these five factors “taken together,” the necessary 
and proper clause provided the federal government with a suf-
ficient basis to enact § 4248.211
The first consideration the majority opinion addressed was 
the “broad authority” that the Necessary and Proper Clause 
grants Congress to enact federal legislation.212 Justice Breyer 
emphasized that while the Federal Government is a government 
“of enumerated powers” and that every law it enacts must “be 
based on one or more of those powers,” the government must 
be provided “ample means” for the execution of these powers.213 
He further asserted that the Court had already made clear that 
in determining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants 
Congress the legislative authority to enact any particular statute, 
it looks to “see whether the statute constitutes a means that is 
rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally 
enumerated power” or “reasonably adapted” to the attainment 
of such a power.214 While the Court’s majority did not speak 
directly to which specific enumerated power § 4248 was ratio-
nally to, it concluded that just as the federal government has 
the power to criminalize conduct, erect prisons, and ensure the 
safety of the prison system under the guise of the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, it has the “broad authority” to enact civil com-
mitment provisions such as that contained in § 4248.215
Second, the majority justified the validity of § 4248 under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause because it considered the 
provision a “modest addition to a set of prison-related mental-
health statutes that have existed for many decades.”216 The Court 
traced the history of such provisions back to the mid-Nineteenth 
Century, demonstrating Congress’ long involvement in the 
mental health care of its federal prisoners.217 By the late 19th 
Century, the federal government had the authority to provide 
for civil commitment of anyone in a federal facility who had 
become “insane during the term of their imprisonment,” as well 
as those who had simply been charged with federal offenses that 
were in the custody of the United States.218 In 1948 and 1949, 
under the direction of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States, Congress enacted legislation providing for the civil com-
mitment of individuals who are or become mentally ill at any 
point between their arrest and the expiration of their sentence, 
and even authorized the commitment of those whose sentences 
were about to expire if that individual’s release would “prob-
ably endanger the safety . . . interests of the United States.”219 
Congress further modified these statutes in 1984, clarifying that 
civil commitment was authorized if the release of the prisoner 
would “create a substantial risk of bodily injury to another per-
son or serious damage to the property of another.”220 The Court 
considered this history to be a relevant factor in determining 
that Congress had the authority to enact § 4248, as it differs 
from these earlier statutes only in that it focuses on persons who 
are sexually dangerous due to mental illness.221
The third factor the Court considered was whether it was 
reasonable for the federal government to extend its “longstand-
ing civil-commitment system” to cover individuals in federal 
custody, even if it would result in detaining them beyond the 
expiration of their sentence.222 The Court emphasized the role of 
the federal government as the “custodian” of federal prisoners, 
and the common law duty of a custodian to “exercise reason-
able care to control” the person in its care from causing “bodily 
harm to others.”223 Justice Breyer analogized this situation to 
one in which a federal prisoner is infected with a communicable 
disease that would spread to others if the government were to 
release him.224 Certainly, he insisted, if the federal government 
can take action pursuant to the Necessary and Proper Clause 
to stay the release of such a person for the general welfare of 
the public, so too could the government stay the release of an 
individual whose mental illness poses a threat to the well-being 
of the general public.225 Ultimately, the Court found that § 4248 
was “reasonably adapted” to the power of the federal govern-
ment to act as a responsible federal custodian given the “high 
danger” inmates suffering from mental illness could cause to the 
public if they were released, especially in light of the low like-
lihood of states taking custody of such individuals upon their 
release.226
Next, the Court addressed another pressing concern that § 
4248 raised: the potential infringement it imposes on the sover-
eignty of the states.227 The Court rejected the notion that § 4248 
violated the rights of the states for two reasons. First, the Justice 
Breyer maintained that although the Tenth Amendment reserves 
powers not delegated to the United States through the Constitu-
tion are “reserved to the States,” the powers delegated to the 
United States include those powers granted to the federal gov-
ernment through the Necessary and Proper Clause.228 Second, 
he asserted that § 4248 does not impede on state sovereignty, 
because the statute in fact aims to accommodate state interests 
by requiring the Attorney General to inform the state in which 
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the prisoner was tried or domiciled that he intends to continue 
to detain the prisoner, and to encourage that state to assume 
the custody of that individual.229 If the state chooses to assume 
responsibility of that individual, the federal government must 
hand responsibility over to the state immediately.230 This will-
ingness to accommodate state interests was therefore another 
factor the Court took into account in determining that Congress 
had the authority to enact § 4248.
Finally, the Court concluded that the connection between § 
4248 and a power enumerated in Article I was “not too attenu-
ated,” and that the provision itself was not “too sweeping” in 
scope to be justified under the Necessary and Proper Clause.231 
In reaching this conclusion, the majority rejected the notion that 
federal legislation can only be justified under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause if it is “no more than one step removed” from an 
enumerated power.232 It explained that the power to punish is 
an implied (rather than expressly granted) power, and that the 
Court has already inferred from that implied power the power 
to imprison as well as the power to civilly commit prisoners.233 
While conceding that it could not point to a single specific enu-
merated power that grants Congress the authority to arrest or 
convict a criminal, the Court asserted same enumerated power 
that gives Congress this authority further justifies its ability to 
create a civil commitment program for such criminals.234
Justice Kennedy took a slightly narrower approach than the 
majority to reach the conclusion that § 4248 was a constitutional 
exercise of Congressional authority. Emphasizing the impor-
tance of the “strength of the chain” that connects legislation to 
an enumerated power, Justice Kennedy expressed concern over 
the majority’s application of the terms “rationally related” and 
“rational basis” to its analysis under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.235 While the majority opinion did not clarify how “ra-
tional” a rational basis must be in order to justify the enactment 
of legislation under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Justice 
Kennedy asserted that such an analysis should run “parallel” 
to the standard applied in Commerce Clause cases—one that 
requires a “link in fact” between the legislation enacted and the 
purported enumerated power.236
Similarly, Justice Alito concurred in the judgment, but 
expressed concern with the majority’s approach. Like Justice 
Kennedy, Justice Alito believed that § 4248 was necessary and 
proper, “on narrow grounds,” to the execution of Congress’ 
constitutional powers.237 However, Justice Alito was weary of 
the “breadth” of the majority opinion, as well as the ambigu-
ity that its standard created.238 While maintaining that the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause only grants Congress the authority 
to enact laws that carry an enumerated power into execution, 
Justice Alito believed that § 4248 was necessary and proper 
to executing “the enumerated powers that support the federal 
criminal statutes under which the affected prisoners were con-
victed.”239 Justice Alito noted that in order to exercise its exer-
cise its authority, it is a necessary and proper power of Congress 
to “criminalize certain conduct,” and moreover, that it is neces-
sary and proper to “provide the operation of a federal criminal 
justice system and a federal prison system” in order to regulate 
such conduct.240 Thus, he approached § 4248 as a law that takes 
this system one step further, and posed the question at issue 
as whether it was also necessary and proper for Congress to 
“protect the public from dangers created by the federal criminal 
justice and prison systems” by enacting this civil commitment 
provision.241 In his view, it was—and thus, he concurred with 
the judgment of the Court.242
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, dissented. While 
the majority summarily stated that § 4248 was necessary and 
proper to the execution of an enumerated power, the dissent 
insisted that the provision “[e]xecutes no enumerated power.”243 
Justice Thomas read a two-part test into McCulloch, maintain-
ing that federal legislation is only valid under the Necessary and 
Proper clause if: 1) “it is directed toward a ‘legitimate’ end,” 
one that is within the scope of powers “expressly delegated” 
to Congress by the Constitution, and 2) there is a “fit” between 
federal law (what he describes as “the means”) and the enumer-
ated power the law is designed to serve (what he describes as 
“the end”).244 Moreover, Justice Thomas insisted that the rela-
tionship between these two requirements is a “linear” one: if it 
is not directed toward a legitimate end within the scope of Con-
gress’ enumerated powers, whether there is a “fit” between the 
means and the end is irrelevant, regardless of how “necessary” 
or “proper” the end may be.245
With this framework in mind, Justice Thomas had a number 
of criticisms of the standard that the majority created, as well as 
the conclusion that it reached. The majority’s greatest misstep, 
Justice Thomas believed, was focusing on the amount of defer-
ence the Court owed to Congress in selecting the means that 
it adopted, rather than focusing on whether the end itself was 
legitimate.246 This, he felt, led the Court to overlook carefully 
examining whether § 4248 even served to enact an enumerated 
power—something he believed the provision did not do.247
The dissent rejected the notion that § 4248 was necessary 
and proper to carry an enumerated power into execution for 
three reasons. First, the provision’s definition of a “sexually 
dangerous person” does not contain an element that links his 
purported dangerousness to the crime that he committed and 
thus allows a court to civilly commit an individual in federal 
custody even if he had never been charged with or committed a 
federal crime that related to sexual violence.248 Second, the pro-
vision allows for the civil commitment of an individual beyond 
the date that his sentence expires, thus extending the govern-
ment’s authority over the individual to beyond its authority to 
prosecute.249 Finally, Justice Thomas criticized § 4248 for fail-
ing to require that the individual deemed “sexually dangerous” 
was likely to even violate a law that executed an enumerated 
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power in the future.250 In other words, while conceding that the 
Federal Government does have the authority to enact certain 
laws related to sexual violence when such laws are linked di-
rectly to an enumerated power, such as the commerce power, § 
4248 contained no hook that tied it to such a power or limited 
its reach to jurisdictions in which Congress has “plenary au-
thority.”251 In short, while Justice Thomas recognized that the 
powers enumerated to Congress might justify an individual’s 
arrest, conviction, or imprisonment, he believed they could not 
also justify his civil commitment under § 4248.252 
Justice Thomas similarly rejected the remaining factors 
that the majority considered in reaching its conclusion. He criti-
cized the majority’s adoption of the Restatement’s definition 
of a custodian as a basis to justify the enact-
ment of § 4248, sarcastically noting that he 
federal government’s power is derived from 
the Constitution, rather than from common 
law.253 Moreover, he asserted that the major-
ity “overstate[d] the relevant history” of the 
federal government’s involvement in civil 
commitment, all the while asserting that a 
long-time historical practice cannot “serve as 
a substitute for its constitutionality.”254 Finally, 
Justice Thomas dismissed § 4248’s “accom-
modation” of state interests through its allowance for states to 
“assume responsibility” of a released individual as “mere win-
dow dressing,” and a mere “hollow assurance” that the provi-
sion would not disrupt the balance struck between federal and 
state powers.255
In short, over the objections of Justice Thomas and Jus-
tice Scalia, the Court held that Congress had the authority to 
enact § 4248, and that the Necessary and Proper Clause granted 
them such authority. While two members of the Court expressed 
reservations about the breadth of the Court’s opinion, and the 
lack of clarity in the standard that it created, a five-member 
majority concluded that in light of the breadth of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, the Court’s long history of involvement in 
civil commitment, the government’s custodial interest at stake, 
the provision accommodation of state interests, and the narrow 
scope of § 4248, the Necessary and Proper Clause provided the 
federal government with sufficient authority to enact his piece 
of legislation.
v. conclUsion
Regardless of one’s opinion as to the authority that the fed-
eral government has to enact legislation under its Article I pow-
ers, there is no doubt that § 4248 aims to serve a significant and 
noble public policy purpose: to protect the safety of the public at 
large from the dangers that sexual predators pose to our society. 
Whether or not this policy was in fact the driving motivation 
behind the Court’s decision in Comstock, it had no other option 
than to create a new standard under the Necessary and Proper 
Clause in order to uphold the validity of the provision. The Act 
would not have survived a Commerce Clause analysis under 
the stringent three-prong test created in United States v. Lopez, 
and even in light of Gonzales v. Raich’s arguable expansion of 
Congress’ commerce power, the Court would not have been 
able to find that the provision “substantially affects” interstate 
commerce without further expanding the scope of the Lopez 
test. Moreover, none of the established precedent created under 
the Necessary and Proper Clause provided the Court with suf-
ficient support, on its own, to justify validating 
this legislation. While McCulloch v. Maryland 
created a base line standard—that the end must 
be “legitimate” and the means must be “appro-
priate”256—the Court spoke little else beyond 
this requirement, leaving clear how closely 
linked the legislation must be to an enumerated 
power in order for it to be within the scope of 
Congress’ powers.
In Comstock, the Court created a new stan-
dard under which issues of federalism and Con-
gress’ authority to enact legislation can be analyzed. In doing 
so, it developed a set of five considerations that it may take into 
account when determining whether the Necessary and Proper 
Clause grants Congress the authority to enact legislation: (1) the 
breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause itself; (2) whether 
there is a history of federal involvement in the arena being regu-
lated by a legislative act, (3) whether a “sound reason” exists for 
the federal government to become involved in light of the fed-
eral interests at stake (4) whether the legislation takes into ac-
count, and accommodates for, state interests; and (5) the scope 
of the legislation at issue. While leaving unclear whether these 
factors might always be taken into account in the future, the 
Court concluded here that § 4248 fell within Congress authority 
in light of these considerations.
This decision may have profound implications on future 
litigation in this area. Up until now, it appeared that the Com-
merce Clause was the only real avenue for the federal govern-
ment to take in order to justify legislation that might not appear, 
at first glance, to be within its enumerated powers.257 While the 
Supreme Court spoke very little of the Necessary and Proper 
Clause prior to this decision beyond mere iterations of the lan-
guage in McCulloch,258 the five factor test that it established will 
now almost certainly come into play in future cases. For good or 
ill, this decision certainly “breathes new life”259 into the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, and only time will tell what limitations, 




created a new 
standard
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Proper Clause, and that the authority to enact laws that are necessary and 
proper to Congress’ regulation of interstate commerce “is not limited 
to laws governing intrastate activities that substantially affect interstate 
commerce.” Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 34–35 (2005) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). He insisted that Congress has the authority to “regulate even 
noneconomic local activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more 
general regulation of interstate commerce” so long as the “means chosen 
are ‘reasonably adapted’ to the attainment of a legitimate end under the 
commerce power.” Id. at 37.
125  Tom II, 565 F.3d at 504–05 (citing Raich, 545 U.S. at 35).
126  Id. at 506.
127  Id. at 505–06.
128  United States v. Volungus, 595 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2010).
129  350 U.S. 366 (1956).
130  Volungus, 595 F.3d at 6.
131  Greenwood, 350 U.S. at 367-68.
132  Volungus, 595 F.3d at 7. But see infra notes 232–244 (distinguishing 
the law at issue in Comstock from the law at issue in Greenwood).
133  Compare United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1133–34 
(D. Haw. 2008) (upholding § 4248); United States v. Dowell, No. CIV-06-
1216-D, 2007 WL 5361304, at *7 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 5, 2007) (upholding § 
4248); United States v. Shields, 522 F. Supp. 2d 317, 328 (D. Mass. 2007) 
(upholding § 4248); United States v. Carta, 503 F. Supp. 2d 405, 409, 410 
(D. Mass. 2007) (upholding § 4248) with United States v. Wilkinson, 626 
F. Supp. 2d 184 (D. Mass. 2009) (overturning § 4248); United States v. 
Volungus, 599 F. Supp. 2d 68, 80 (D. Mass. 2009) (overturning § 4248); 
United States v. Tom, 558 F. Supp. 2d 931, 941 (D. Minn. 2008) [here-
inafter Tom I] (overturning § 4248), rev’d, 565 F.3d 497 (8th Cir. 2009); 
United States v. Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d 522, 559 (E.D.N.C. 2007) 
(overturning § 4248), aff’d, 551 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2009).
134  See, e.g., Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 1129–30 (holding that Con-
gress had the authority to enact § 4248 because “it has the power to crimi-
nalize certain conduct and to ‘make all laws which shall be necessary and 
proper’ to execute its enumerated power”); Dowell, 2007 WL 5361304, 
at *7 (concluding that Congress was authorized to enact § 4248, as it “is 
a necessary and proper exercise of the federal government’s power under 
the Commerce Clause to prevent the commission of federal sex crimes); 
Shields, 522 F. Supp. 2d at 326 (“Section 4248 is a necessary and proper 
exercise of the federal government’s power under the Commerce Clause 
to prevent the commission of federal sex crimes.”); Carta, 503 F. Supp. 
2d at 408 (determining that the scope of Congress’ “auxiliary power . . . 
extends so far as to allow Congress to prevent the release of those law-
fully in custody”).
135  See, e.g., Wilkinson, 626 F. Supp. 2d at 194 (holding the government 
reliance on the Necessary and Proper Clause “undermine[d] the historic 
distinction between state and federal authority” and that the enactment 
of § 4248 “exceeded Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause 
and Necessary and Proper Clause”); Volungus, 599 F. Supp. 2d at 77–78 
(concluding that because § 4248 “offers only remote and contingent 
support for the regulation of interstate commerce” and “encroaches on an 
area of law-making that has historically been . . . a matter of the exercise 
by the States,” it does not fall within the scope of congressional authority 
to enact legislation); Tom I, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 941 (ruling that because 
Congress had exceeded its authority in enacting § 4248, the court was 
“required to take the uncommon but necessary step of finding that the 
statute [was] unconstitutional); Comstock, 507 F. Supp. 2d at 559 (finding 
that § 4248 is unconstitutional because § 4248 “is not sufficiently tied to 
the exercise of any enumerated or otherwise identifiable constitutional 
power of Congress”).
136  United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. ___,No. 08-1224, 2010 WL 
1946729 at *15 (May 17, 2010).
137  See, e.g., United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1131-32 
(D. Haw. 2008) (arguing that Congress had the authority to enact § 4248, 
since it has the authority under the Commerce Clause “to criminalize 
and punish” the type of conduct that offenders to whom § 4248 applies 
to have committed); see also United States v. Tom, 565 F.3d 497, 595 
(8th Cir. 2009) (holding that “Congress, having been empowered by the 
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Commerce Clause to criminalize and punish the conduct of which [the 
respondent] is guilty, has the ancillary authority under the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to provide for his civil commitment”); United States v. 
Shields, 522 F. Supp. 2d 317, 325-326 (D. Mass. 2007) (stating that “it is 
difficult to accept the proposition” that the government cannot prevent the 
release of an individual who has committed a crime for which the federal 
government has the power to enact under the Commerce Clause); United 
States v. Dowell, No. CIV-06-1216-D, 2007 WL 5361304, at *5 (W.D. 
Okla. Dec. 5 2007) (noting that the government contended that “§ 4248 is 
a rational means of safeguarding Congress’s ability to prevent the future 
commissions of the acts which it is authorized to prohibit”).
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560 U.S. __ (2010) (No. 08-1224) (Solicitor General Elena Kagan stating 
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. the Morrison precedent”).
139  Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 26 (2005).
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Rehnquist Court overturned legislation on Commerce Power grounds for 
the first time in five decades in United States v. Lopez, limiting Congress’ 
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being of our nation. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The Court again overturned 
legislation on commerce power grounds five years later in United States 
v. Morrison. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
141  See Bryant, supra note 47, at 154-55 (observing that a debate 
among scholars has arisen as to whether Raich “mark[ed] the end of the 
Lopez revolution or merely a minor diversion from the course Lopez had 
launched”);”) Corey Rayburn Young, One of these Laws is Not Like the 
Others: Why the Federal Sex Offender Registration And Notification Act 
Raises New Constitutional Questions, 46 harv. J. on legis. 369, 409 
(2009) (explaining that, because the Supreme Court has not reviewed 
any legislation under commerce clause jurisprudence since Raich, there 
remains “substantial uncertainty as to the precise meaning of Raich in 
relation to the prior decisions in Lopez and Morrison”); Skarin, supra 
note 29, at 206 (accusing the Court’s Raich decision of “muddying . . . 
commerce clause jurisprudence”).
142  See Bryant, supra note 47, at 155 (asserting that “history strongly 
suggests” that Raich will “prove fatal to [the] hope]” that Lopez and 
Morrison “held promise of a meaningful judicial enforcement of the 
enumerated powers scheme,” as Raich demonstrates that the Court cannot 
“stretch congressional powers to encompass plenary authority” over 
portions of a targeted regulation “while simultaneously preserving robust 
judicial enforcement of the enumerated powers scheme”);
143  See Pushaw, supra note 58, at 908 (asserting that it would be 
“premature to pronounce Raich the death knell of the Rehnquist Court’s 
Commerce Clause revolution,” as the Court’s majority and concurring 
opinions reaffirmed Morrison and Lopez by applying those cases’ 
“imprecise standards on a case by case basis”); Skarin, supra note 29, 
at 212 (arguing that the “economic/noneconomic” distinction applied in 
Raich was proper because it was “at least plausible” that Congress had the 
authority to regulate the respondents’ activities because they “involve[d] 
the economics of agricultural commodities”).
144  See Raich, 545 U.S. at 23 (distinguishing itself by noting that the 
respondents were asking the Court to “excise individual applications of a 
concededly valid statutory schemes,” whereas Lopez and Morrison “fell 
outside Congress’ commerce power in its entirety”) (emphasis added). 
In fact, even the respondents in Raich conceded that the passage of the 
CSA was “well within Congress’ power,” and, consequently, challenged 
the law’s regulation of the manufacture and possession of marijuana as 
applied to their use of it for medical purposes. Id. at 15.
145  See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 604 (2000) (stating that 
the petitioners moved to dismiss their case on grounds that the Act’s civil 
remedy provision was unconstitutional); United State v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 552 (1995) (noting that the respondent was challenging the GFSZA 
on grounds that it exceeded Congress’ authority to enact legislation under 
the commerce clause).
146  Raich, 545 U.S. at 15.
147  Raich, 545 U.S. at 23. (citations and internal quotations omitted).
148  The respondents in Raich even conceded that the Controlled 
Substances Act was valid on its face. Raich, 545 U.S. at 15. They did 
not seek to invalidate the statute completely; they merely wanted it 
invalidated as applied to their particular use of marijuana for medicinal 
purposes. Id.
149  See Doss, supra note 29, at 528 (suggesting that facial challenges to 
federal legislation “trigger[] application of the framework established in 
Lopez and refined in Morrison” while as-applied challenges “operate[] 
the more deferential and expansive Raich standards”).
150  Lopez challenged the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School 
Zones Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V). United States 
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995). This Act made it unlawful “for any 
individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual 
knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.” Id. at 551.
151  Morrison challenged the constitutionality of a provision 18 U.S.C. 
§ 13981. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601 (2000). This provision 
declared that “A person . . . who commits a crime of violence motivated 
by gender . . . shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for 
the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and 
declaratory relief, and such other relief as a court may deem appropriate.” 
Id. at 605 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 13981(c)).
152  See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 617-18 (recognizing that the “regulation 
and punishment of intrastate violence” is the a clear example of the type 
of police power that “the Founders denied the National Government and 
reposed in the States); United State v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) 
(insisting that the federal government does not have a “general police 
power of the sort retained to the states).
153  The Gun-Free School Zones Act at issue in Lopez sought to 
regulate an individual’s possession of a firearm while in a school zone 
by criminalizing such conduct. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551. The provision of 
the Violence Against Women Act at issue in Morrison sought to regulate 
“violence motivated by gender” by making those who committed such 
violence liable for compensatory and punitive damages, as well as 
injunctive and declaratory relief, to the party that they injured. Morrison, 
529 U.S. at 605.
154  As discussed above, the Supreme Court cited this shortcoming as 
among the reasons for overturning each of these acts. See supra Part 
I.b for a more comprehensive discussion of the Court’s decision in each 
respective case.
155  See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 609 (maintaining that the “regulation 
and punishment of intrastate violence” has generally always been in the 
realm of state authority); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 566 (1995) (insisting, in 
overturning the GFSZA, that the federal government does not have a 
general police power). See supra Part I.c for a general discussion of the 
powers that the Tenth Amendment reserves to the states and the types of 
police power legislation the federal government does have the authority to 
enact.
156  Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24-25 (2005).
157  Id. at 25-26. They recognized the activities as economic because they 
affected the “production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.” 
Id. at 25.
158  Id. at 22. In particular, the Court reasoned that Congress had a 
rational basis for believing that the respondents’ home consumption 
of marijuana could influence the “supply and demand of controlled 
substances in both lawful and unlawful drug markets,” just as the farmer 
in Wickard’s home consumption of wheat could have “a substantial 
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Filburn, 317 U.S. 311, 115 (1942)).
159  Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610.
160  Id. at 605.
161  United State v. Lopez 514 U.S. at 551.
162  See 18 U.S.C. 4248(e) (permitting the release of an offender under 
the civil commitment program when the director of the facility in which 
he is placed determines that he is “no longer sexually dangerous to 
others”).
163  Raich, 545 U.S. at 25, 27.
164  Id. at 26-27.
165  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558.
166  The Court quickly dismissed the GFSZA under this first prong. 
See id. at 559 (observing that the first prong could be “quickly disposed 
of,” as the GFSZA was did not regulate the use of channels of interstate 
commerce).
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interstate commerce.
168  18 U.S.C. § 4248.
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529 U.S. at 609.
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commerce.
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be regulated is either tied to interstate commerce of federal jurisdiction 
(jurisdictional element). See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 588, 561 (noting that if 
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jurisdictional requirements) with 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (conditioning the act 
upon the violator being “in or affecting interstate commerce or foreign 
commerce, or within the special maritime and territory”); 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2242 (2007) (limiting the reach of the law to those “in the special 
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or in any Federal 
prison”; 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2008) (outlawing persons from transporting or 
shipping visual depictions of minors “in interstate or foreign commerce”). 
See infra Part V for a more thorough discussion as to the impact that 
including a jurisdictional element may have on the constitutionality of § 
4248.
172  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 557.
173  See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 612.
174  Id. at 611.
175  See Id. at 610 (noting that a “fair reading of Lopez shows that the 
non-economic, criminal nature of the conduct at issue was central” to its 
decision in that case that the GFSZA was unconstitutional).
176  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63. It also rejected the government’s 
argument that violent crime in school zones can have an effect on the 
national economy as a demonstration that the provision had a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce. Id. at 563-64.
177  See Comstock, 551 F.3d at 280 (noting that the record in this case 
contained no legislative findings indicating that sexual dangerousness 
would have a substantial effect on interstate commerce); see also 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 562-63 (proposing that legislative findings regarding 
a statute’s effect on interstate commerce might enable the Court to 
“evaluate the legislative judgment” that the activity being regulated 
affects interstate commerce). Though the Court conceded that such 
findings are not normally required, it purported that such findings could 
be useful when “no such substantial effect [is] visible to the naked eye.” 
Id. at 562-63.
178  See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614, (asserting that “simply because 
Congress may conclude that a particular activity substantially affects 
interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so)” (quoting Lopez, 
514 U.S. at 557). In Morrison, the government did put forth findings 
concerning the “serious impact that gender-motivated violence has on 
victims and their families.” Id at 599..
179  See id. at 615 (“If accepted, petitioners’ reasoning would allow 
Congress to regulate any crime as long as the nationwide, aggregated 
impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment, production, 
transit, or consumption.”).
180  In both cases, the Court emphasized that Congress’ authority under 
the Commerce Clause is not without limit. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 607; 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567. In Morrison, the Court emphasized Chief Justice 
Marshall’s contention in Marbury v. Madison that “The powers of the 
legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be 
mistake or forgotten, the constitution is written.” Morrison, 529 U.S. at 
607 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803)). 
In Lopez, the Court noted that even modern Commerce Clause precedent 
that had expanded Congress’ commerce power “confirm[ed]]. . .] that the 
scope of the interstate commerce power . . . may not be extended so as to 
embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote” that 
adopting them would “obliterate the distinction between what is national 
and what is local.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-57 (citations and internal 
quotations omitted).
181  See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615 (asserting that if the Court upheld 
the VAWA, it would allow Congress “to regulate any crime as long as the 
nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on 
employment, production, transit, or consumption”).
182  See The Mighty Sweeping Clause and Expansive Federal Power, 
ConstitUtional laW Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw 
(May 18, 2010).
183  Raich, 545 U.S. at 25-26.
184  As noted above, the Court in Raich maintained that “’ [e]conomics’ 
refers to the ‘production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.” 
Id. at 26 (citation omitted).
185 Comstock, 551 F.3d at 279.
186  See Raich, 545 U.S. at 30 (finding that the personal consumption of 
marijuana, taken in aggregation, could “have a significant impact on both 
the supply and demand sides of the market for marijuana”).
187  Id. at 34 (Scalia, J., concurring).
188  Id.
189  Id. at 35-37 (Scalia, J., concurring).
190  Id. at 41-42.
191  The Eighth Circuit adopted Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion 
in United States v. Tom, in upholding § 4248. 565 F.3d 497, 502 (8th 
Cir. 2009). However, in the only other lower court opinion to address 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence, United States v. Wilkinson, the District of 
Massachusetts recognized that Raich did not apply because “there was no 
comprehensive scheme of regulation of interstate commerce threatened” 
by § 4248. 626 F. Supp. 2d 184, 191-92 (D. Mass. 2009).
192  U.s. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 356 (1819) (“To make a law constitutional, nothing 
more is necessary than that it should be fairly adapted to carry into effect 
some specific power given to congress.”); Lawson & Granger, supra note 
22, at 331 (observing that congressional laws “must respect the system of 
enumerated federal powers” and may not regulate activities that fall out-
side the scope of powers enumerated in the Constitution).
193  United States v. Comstock, 551 F.3d 274, 281 (2009).
194  For example, in United States v. Dowell, 2007 WL 5361304 at *5, 
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the Western District of Oklahoma based its decision to uphold § 4248 in 
large part on the Third Circuit’s decision in United States v. Perry, 788 
F.2d 100 (3d. Cir. 1986). In Perry, the Third Circuit upheld 18 U.S.C. § 
3142(e), which authorizes the pre-trial detention of an accused person 
when nothing could reasonably assure that this person would appear 
for trial or that the community would be unsafe if such a person were 
released. Id. at 111, 103. The Third Circuit concluded that because Con-
gress had the authority to enact the federal laws for which the defendant 
was accused of committing, it had “the auxiliary authority” through the 
Necessary and Proper Clause to civilly commit these persons to prevent 
the recurrence of crime. Id.
The district court in Dowell also based its argument on a Tenth 
Circuit case, United States v. Plotts, 347 F.3d 873 (10th Cir. 2003), which 
held that the Necessary and Proper Clause gives congress the power 
to enact laws “that bear a rational connection to any of its enumerated 
powers United States v. Plotts, 347 F.3d 873,878 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(quoting United States v. Edgar, 304 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2002)). 
The Tenth Circuit relied on the fact that the respondent had committed 
a crime that Congress had the authority to enact through its commerce 
power, and concluded that the DNA Act, which was at issue in Plotts, 
was a “necessary and proper sanction” to this “valid criminal law.” Id. 
at 878-79. The Court also maintained that even if the DNA Act was 
viewed as a “law enforcement tool,” rather than a “sanction,” the law 
would then have been a necessary and proper exercise of the Executive 
branch’s law enforcement powers. Id. The Court essentially applied the 
framework under this scenario as it did in construing the DNA Act as 
a sanction—that the law the respondent had violated was valid under 
Congress’ commerce power, and that the Necessary and Proper Clause 
gives Congress the authority to enact laws that aid the executive branch 
in its “duty to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” Id. at 779 
(citations omitted)
Such heavy reliance on Courts of Appeals cases are indicative of 
the fact that the Courts who have upheld § 4248 under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause had no Supreme Court precedent to support their 
argument. That the Third and Tenth Circuits came to these conclusions 
on the application of the Necessary and Proper Clause did not indicate 
that the Supreme Court will adopt their arguments, as Appellate Court 
decisions have no binding authority over the Supreme Court. See U.s. 
Const. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be 
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress 
may from time to time ordain and establish.”) (emphasis added). See 
generally United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 1131 (D. Haw. 
2008) (relying on decisions in 9th and 10th Circuit in implementing its § 
4248 rationale); United States v. Dowell, No. CIV-06-1216-D, 2007 WL 
5361304, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 5 2007) (citing 10th and 11th Circuit 
cases as its basis for its necessary and proper rationale).
195  At oral arguments, Solicitor General Kagan summarily referred 
to Congress’ “power to run a criminal justice system that does not 
itself endanger the public” as the power “conferred upon the Federal 
Government by the Constitution” to enact § 4248. Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 7, United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. __ (2010) (No. 
08-1224). Even in the Comstock majority opinion itself, Justice Breyer 
merely alluded to a number of powers the Constitution grants Congress, 
including the power to regulate interstate commerce, to enforce civil 
rights, and to expend funds for the welfare of the public, without pointing 
to precisely which power granted Congress the authority to enact § 4248. 
United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. ___,No. 08-1224, 2010 WL 1946729 
at *7 (May 17, 2010).
196  350 U.S. 366 (1956); see, e.g., United States v. Tom, 565 F.3d 397, 
504 (8th Cir. 2009) (maintaining that Greenwood was “dispositive” of the 
issue § 4248 presented); United States v. Abregana, 574 F. Supp. 2d 1123, 
1130 (D. Haw. 2008) (recognizing that, while the decision in Greenwood 
was limited to the facts of that case, “the basis of the decision [was] 
instructive”); United States v. Shields, 522 F. Supp. 2d 317, 325 (D. Mass. 
2007) (observing that Greenwood reasoning at least applies to those who 
are in custody of the Attorney General based on their incompetency to 
stand trial under § 4248).
197  Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 368 (1956).
198  Id. at 375
199  See id. (“We reach then the narrow constitutional issue raised by 
the order of commitment in the circumstances of this case.”) (emphasis 
added).
200  Id.
201  18 U.S.C. § 4248(a).
202  Id.
203  See Salerno & Goldstein, supra note 1, at 32-33 (discussing the 
depth and breadth of the Act’s reach); Fabian, supra note 66, at 44, 
50 (expressing concerns that the act will result in the indefinite civil 
commitment of “low-risk” and “non-contact” sex offenders, as “sex 
offenders who suffer from any type of mental illness, disorder, or 
abnormality may be committed under the AWA”); Amy Baron-Evans and 
Sara Noonan, Grid & Bear It, ChamPion, July 2008 at 58, 58 (calling to 
attention that the statute “does not require a current or prior sex-related 
conviction or even a sex-related charge,” but rather that anyone in the 
custody of the Bureau of Prisons may be civilly committed under this 
program).
204 Greenwood, 350 U.S. at 375; see also Salerno & Goldstein, supra 
note 1, at 32, 35 (noting that under the Act, the government can wait to 
determine the danger an offender poses until after his sentence has been 
completed).
205  See Comstock, 551 F.3d at 282 (noting that most violent sex offenses 
are state, rather than federal, offenses).
206  See Cong. reC. S8017, 2006 WL 2034117 (noting that before the 
enactment of the Adam Walsh Act, three-quarters of all violent sex 
offenders re-committed their original crime).
207  See id. (holding that because most sexually violent crimes are 
prohibited under state law, § 4248 “sweeps far too broadly,” as many of 
the civil commitments imposed under § 4248 would prevent the future 
commission of state law).
208  See United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. ___,No. 08-1224, 2010 
WL 1946729 at *13 (May 17, 2010) (citing Greenwood as an example 
of precedent that infers the power of the federal government to civilly 
commit prisioners).
209  Comstock at *3 (internal quotations omitted).
210  Id. at *15.
211  Id. at *5.
212  Id.
213  Id. at *6 (emphasis added) (quoting Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 
600, 605 (2004).
214  Id. at *8. Notably, although Justice Scalia dissented from the major-
ity opinion, the language Justice Breyer here directly mirrors that of Jus-
tice Scalia in his concurring opinion in Gonzales v. Raich. See Gonzales 
v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 37 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that the 
proper inquiry under a Commerce Clause analysis is “whether the means 
chosen are reasonably adapted to the attainment of a legitimate end under 
the commerce power”) (internal quotations omitted); see also supra Notes 
88–91 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia’s concurrence 
in Raich). Some scholar have suggested that Scalia’s dissent in Comstock 
demonstrates “that he may be having second thoughts about the very 
broad view of the Necessary and Proper Clause” he adopted in his con-
currence in Raich, while the Comstock decision itself demonstrates that 
the rest of the Court, with the exception of Justice Thomas, have accepted 
the approach that Justice Scalia took in Raich. Posting of Ilya Somin to 
The Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/ (May 17, 2010, 15:00 EST); 
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ous Federal Prisoners: Could it Hold the Key to the Constitutionality of 
the Individual Mandate to Buy Health Insurance?, findlaW, May 19, 
2010, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20100519.html.
215  Comstock, 2010 WL at *8.
216  Id.
217  Id. at *8-9.
218  Id. at *8 (internal quotations omitted).
219  Id. at *9-10.
220  Id. at *10; see 18 U.S.C. § 4246 (d) (2006).
221  Comstock, 2010 WL at *10. The Court further noted that many of the 
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Id.
222  Id. at *11.
223  Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319).
224  Id.
225  Id.
226  Id. The Court noted that the Federal government “severed” the 
inmates claim to “legal residence in any state” once they held them in 
“remote federal prisons.” Id.
227  Id. at *11-12. See infra Part I.c for a discussion of the Tenth 
Amendment and the powers reserved to the states.
228  Comstock, 2010 WL at *11.
229  Id. at *12.
230  Id.
231  Id. at *13.
232  Id.
233  Id.
234  Id. at *14-15.
235  Id. at *16 (Kennedy, J., concurring). His concern was that “rational 
basis” creates different standards depending on what the Court is analyz-
ing. Id. at *16-17. For example, Justice Kennedy demonstrated that the 
“rational basis” standard is more exacting in Commerce Clause cases (cit-
ing Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005)) than it is in due process cases 
(citing Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483). Id. The 
former, he asserts, requires a “demonstrated link in fact” between an act 
of Congress and an enumerated power, while the latter does not. Id.
236  Id. at *17.
237  Id. at *18 (Alito, J., concurring).
238  Id.
239  Id. at 19.
240  Id. at *19-20.
241  Id. at *20.
242  Id. Justice Alito reasoned that “[j]ust as it is necessary and proper for 
Congress to provide for the apprehension of escaped federal prisoners, it 
is necessary and proper for Congress to provide for the civil commitment 
of dangerous federal prisoners who would otherwise escape civil commit-
ment as a result of federal imprisonment.” Id.
243  Id. at 21 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
244  Id. at *22 (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 
421 (1819)).
245  Id.
246  See id. at *25. Justice Thomas criticized the Court for “put[ting] 
the cart before the horse” in its opinion, as the “fit” between a statute 
and its aim only matters if the end itself is legitimate. Id. Because he 
believed that no enumerated power grants Congress the authority to have 
individuals civilly committed, it was of no matter to Justice Thomas that 
the ends and means here fit. Id.
247  Id.
248  Id. at *27. And in fact, Justice Thomas noted that this concern 
was not one that was “merely hypothetical,” as almost one-fifth of the 
individuals civilly committed under § 4248 had in fact never been charged 
with committing a crime that involved “sexual violence.” Id. at *27.
249  Id. at *27. In discussing this issue, Justice Thomas contrasted 
this case with Greenwood , where the law at issue limited the federal 
government’s authority over an individual to only when the individual was 
incompetent to stand trial or the charges against him had been dropped. 
Id.; see supra notes 234–243 and accompanying text for a more in-depth 
discussion of Greenwood and its distinction from Comstock.
250  Comstock, 2010 WL at *27.
251  Id.
252  Id.
253  Id. at *28.
254  Id.
255  Id. at *30. Moreover, Justice Thomas emphasized that it did not 
matter that states wanted the federal government to assume responsibility 
here, as Congress’ power is “fixed by the constitution,” and not the 
preference of the states themselves. Id. at *31.
256  McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 421 (1819).
257  See supra Part I.b.
258  In fact, almost immediately following the release of the Comstock 
opinion, one blogger noted that the Court has only “examined or 
discussed” its McCulloch decision nine times in the past twenty years. 
Constitutional Law Prof Blog, http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/ 
(May 18, 2010).
259  Comstock, 2010 WL at *31 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
AboUt the AUthor
Lauren Marsh is a rising third-year law student at 
American University Washington College of Law, and 
is the Senior Note and Comment Editor for American 
University Law Review.  She received her B.A. in Po-
litical Science at Allegheny College.  She is spending 
this summer as an intern in the Appellate Division at the 
United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Co-
lumbia.  Her legal interests include Constitutional Law, 
Civil Rights Law, and Criminal Procedure.
